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Abstract
Background: The health sector in Lebanon suffers from high levels of spending and is acknowledged to be a source of 
fiscal waste. Lebanon initiated a series of health sector reforms which aim at containing the fiscal waste caused by high 
and inefficient public health expenditures. Yet these reforms do not address the issues of health equity in use and 
coverage of healthcare services, which appear to be acute. This paper takes a closer look at the micro-level inequities in 
the use of healthcare, in access, in ability to pay, and in some health outcomes.
Methods: We use data from the 2004/2005 Multi Purpose Survey of Households in Lebanon to conduct health equity 
analysis, including equity in need, access and outcomes. We briefly describe the data and explain some of its 
limitations. We examine, in turn, and using standardization techniques, the equity in health care utilization, the impact 
of catastrophic health payments on household wellbeing, the effect of health payment on household 
impoverishment, the equity implications of existing health financing methods, and health characteristics by 
geographical region.
Results: We find that the incidence of disability decreases steadily across expenditure quintiles, whereas the incidence 
of chronic disease shows the opposite pattern, which may be an indication of better diagnostics for higher quintiles. 
The presence of any health-related expenditure is regressive while the magnitude of out-of-pocket expenditures on 
health is progressive. Spending on health is found to be "normal" and income-elastic. Catastrophic health payments 
are likelier among disadvantaged groups (in terms of income, geography and gender). However, the cash amounts of 
catastrophic payments are progressive. Poverty is associated with lower insurance coverage for both private and public 
insurance. While the insured seem to spend an average of almost LL93,000 ($62) on health a year in excess of the 
uninsured, they devote a smaller proportion of their expenditures to health.
Conclusions: The lowest quintiles of expenditures per adult have less of an ability to pay out-of-pocket for healthcare, 
and yet incur healthcare expenditures more often than the wealthy. They have lower rates of insurance coverage, 
causing them to spend a larger proportion of their expenditures on health, and further confirming our results on the 
vulnerability of the bottom quintiles.
Background
Out-of-pocket spending on health is a major concern for
policymakers, especially in developing countries where
direct household payments for health care can account
for the single largest component of household spending
after food expenditures. High private health spending is
related to the incidence of illnesses and chronic diseases,
but it can grow exponentially and affect the living condi-
tions of individuals in situations of crisis, conflict and
natural disasters. These catastrophic health payments can
push households into poverty or into deeper poverty.
Households facing these health expenses may cut back on
other essential household spending such as food and
clothing. Households may also reduce their consumption
of healthcare services, thus causing the health condition
of family members to further deteriorate. To date, there
has been little work done on the level and distribution of
household out-of-pocket payments for health care in the
Middle East, and to what extent household expenditures
on health care affect living standards. Given that the
region is prone to recurrent conflict and political instabil-
ity, it becomes very important to determine who the most
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vulnerable groups with regards to healthcare access and
financing are. We focus in our analysis on the Lebanese
economy, where health equity issues have not yet been
thoroughly studied.
The Lebanese healthcare system suffers from high
spending: almost 8.8% of GDP compared to an average of
5% in the MENA region, of which 54% is private expendi-
ture, 75% of those out-of-pocket. Most spending is geared
towards hospital-based curative care, as the public sector
expenditures on hospitalization accounts for more than
75% of total public health spending in 2006 [1]. Private
sector hospitalization accounts for 48% of total public
health expenditure, which constitutes a significant drain
on public sector finances (Figure 1). Despite high spend-
ing, hospitals in Lebanon are still characterized by a low
occupancy rate in public hospitals (56 percent in 2004
compared to an OECD average of 80 percent). The allo-
cation of total hospital beds, which stands at 36 beds per
10,000 people, is highly skewed towards the capital and
its suburbs, as these areas show a ratio of almost 70 beds
per 10,000; while the poorer regions of South and Eastern
Lebanon have a ratio below 20 beds per 10,000 [2]. In
addition, health services in Lebanon are some of the most
expensive in the region.
One of the structural weaknesses in the Lebanese
health care system is related to the fact that the role of the
Ministry of Health has focused almost exclusively on the
provision of services, while its role in prevention, plan-
ning and regulation remained limited. This is particularly
true in light of the expanding role of the private sector
(Figure 1). Both these factors also explain the prevalence
of the more costly and arguably less effective culture of
curative care rather than the more efficient strategy of
preventive care in the Lebanese healthcare system.
Recognizing the inefficiency of the health care sector in
Lebanon, the World Bank initiated with the Lebanese
Government under the Paris III reform framework a
Social Protection Development Policy Loan (DPL)
including several health sector reforms. The loan package
comprises key reforms in the health insurance sector,
measures to rationalize health expenditures, and critical
reforms in public health policy. The public health reforms
supported by the DPL consist of:
i. Implementation, by the Ministry of Health of a health
expenditure rationalization plan to better contain rising
hospitalization expenditures.
ii. Reform initiative to revitalize primary healthcare
through the implementation of a five-year action plan
based on a recently developed primary healthcare strat-
egy for the country.
iii. Reform initiative to fully develop and operationalize
the national Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI).
iv. Reform initiative to significantly upgrade the core
public health function of disease surveillance.
All these reforms are intended to contain the fiscal
waste caused by high and inefficient public health expen-
ditures (Table 1), in order to render the Lebanese health-
care system more cost-effective. Yet these reforms do not
directly address the issues of health equity and coverage
of healthcare services, which appear quite acute in Leba-
non. These reforms are untargeted and do not specifically
focus on communities with low access to healthcare and
health insurance. In this paper, we propose a different
reform approach than the one suggested by the World
Bank, by focusing on health inequity.
Health inequity can be defined as "a particular type of
difference in health or in the most important influences
on health that could potentially be shaped by policies; it is
a difference in which disadvantaged social groups (such
as the poor, racial/ethnic minorities, women, or other
groups that have persistently experienced social disad-
vantage or discrimination) systematically experience
worse health or greater health risks than more advan-
taged groups " [3]. T hus, inequity in health reflects the
systematic differences across socio-economic groups in
one or more aspects of health [4]. While the definition we
use more closely matches the definition of health equity
as equality in health, it is also consistent with the under-
standing of health inequality as an indicator of general
injustice in society [5,6].
I n  r e c e n t  y e a r s ,  r i s i n g  g l o b a l  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f
health equity has spawned numerous international
research and policy initiatives [7]. These initiatives have
largely focused on measuring and explaining inequalities
in health status outcomes (infant mortality or maternal
mortality), health service use (antenatal care visit), and
Figure 1 Distribution of public health expenditure (2006). Source: 
Ministry of Finance 2006 budget proposal.
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public subsidies supporting health service utilization.
Policy initiatives have sought to alleviate disparities by
addressing modifiable factors through organizational,
economic and/or regulatory reforms. Another focal area
of health equity research has revolved around the pro-
gressivity of health care payments and the catastrophic
and impoverishing impact of these payments on individ-
ual households [7]. A number of global evaluations
mainly conducted by the WHO have highlighted the vari-
ations in household payments for health care and their
implications, shedding light on the international focus
afforded to the issue of financial protection in health care
[8].
This paper takes a closer look at the micro-level inequi-
ties in the use of healthcare, in access to healthcare, in the
ability to pay for it, and in some health outcomes. The
findings contribute to the international literature on
health inequity by providing more evidence from Middle
Eastern countries. The results of our analysis are espe-
cially useful for policymakers in Lebanon and other coun-
tries that face the issue of promoting access to health
services by targeting the most needy, while at the same
time maintaining efficiency and financial stability in vola-
tile security environments.
In the methods section of this paper we briefly describe
the data and explain our choice of measures. We also
explain in several subsections the methods used, includ-
ing two techniques for standardization of our use mea-
sures. We describe, in turn, our measures of health care
utilization, of catastrophic health payments, of existing
health financing methods. In the results and discussion
section, we illustrate our major findings regarding the
equity of healthcare use, the incidence of catastrophic
health payments, the impoverishing effect of healthcare
spending, the distribution of health financing methods
and a geographical breakdown of health characteristics in
the country. We also qualify our results with a discussion
of the limitations of our data and our approach. In the
conclusion section, we summarize our results and pres-
ent policy recommendations based on our findings.
Methods
Data description
This paper uses micro-data from the 2004/2005 Multi-
Purpose Survey of Households conducted by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Ministry
of Social Affairs (MoSA) and the Central Administration
for Statistics (CAS). This is the most recent national sur-
vey of household living conditions to be conducted in
Lebanon. The survey collects data on socio-demograph-
ics, household characteristics (including data on expendi-
tures, assets and geographical characteristics), labor
market characteristics and some health variables. The
data contain information on close to 56,000 individuals
from 13,000 households in all 6 Lebanese mohafazas
(governorates). The survey focuses exclusively on Leba-
nese nationals and therefore excludes other residents in
Lebanon (Palestinian refugees, foreign migrant workers,
etc.).
Access to raw data from the survey was secured
through MoSA, however all income data, including vari-
ables measuring financial assistance in healthcare from
the government or non-profit sectors, remain inaccessi-
ble, as the Central Administration for Statistics has yet to
release the income measures from the survey. The lack of
access to income data constrains our ability to conduct
Table 1: Public sector health spending (2006)
Health expenditure item 2006 Budget Proposal (000 LL) as a % of total budgetary 
expenditures
as a % of GDP
Hospitalization in the private 
sector
240,725,000 2.15% 0.71%
Purchase of Medication 73,156,500 0.65% 0.21%
Hospitalization of public sector 
employees
105,500,000 0.95% 0.31%
Maternity and sickness allowance 25,600,000 0.23% 0.08%
Other 60,064,332 0.53% 0.18%
Total 505,045,832 4.50% 1.48%
Source: Ministry of Finance 2006 Budget Proposal
Total public health spending in 2006, which includes the budgets of the Civil Servants' Cooperatives, the National Social Security Fund (NSSF) 
and the allowances of the Ministries of the Displaced and Education allowances.Salti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
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welfare analysis. As has become standard practice in the
literature, we use the distribution of household expendi-
tures per adult equivalent in our investigation of equity in
access and use. Adult equivalent scaling follows the
OECD scale of weighing as 1 count the first adult and as
0.7 every subsequent adult, and as 0.5 count every indi-
vidual under age 15 in the household. Our poverty line is
also expenditure based, as are some of our variables mea-
suring the use of healthcare services. This presents some
technical difficulties in the analysis of the poverty impli-
cations and impoverishing effects of healthcare expendi-
tures.
Measurement of variables
a. Need variables
We define three need variables based on the availability
of health outcome measures in the household survey.
These include indicator variables for:
1. the presence of a disability
2. the presence of a chronic condition
3. being a mother of a newborn child (within the last 12
months) as we take childbearing to be an indicator of the
need for some healthcare
A list of the disabilities and chronic conditions included
is provided in additional file 1. We include all three of
these variables in our standardizations (described below).
b. Use variables
We define two broad classes of household-level use vari-
ables (which are then scaled to household size to get per-
capita measures):
1. An indicator variable measuring the presence of any
health related expense, including spending on health
insurance.
2. A variable measuring the dollar amounts of health
care spending.
The reason we are able to use the presence of any health
related expense as an indicator of use is that no health
care financing plans in Lebanon involves complete cover-
age of health expenses, with the exception of the govern-
ment provided insurance plan for military and security
personnel. For all other Lebanese citizens, even the most
generous coverage involves some out-of-pocket expendi-
tures, so we take the presence of health-related spending
as an indicator of the use of healthcare services [9].
c. Catastrophic health payments
We then look at the incidence of catastrophic health pay-
ments (payments over 25 percent of expenditures per
adult equivalent) across different population groups and
socioeconomic characteristics.
d. Insurance coverage
We identify two broad classes of insurance plans: publicly
provided plans (the National Social Security Fund, or
NSSF, the Civil Servants' Cooperatives, municipal gov-
ernment plans, and plans of the security and armed
forces) and privately provided plans (for the employed,
the self-employed and the syndicated).
Methods used
a. Means and concentration indexes
The methods that are employed to quantify the degree of
equity in health care include descriptive and regression
techniques using national household survey data
described above. Descriptive methods include compari-
son of means and the 'concentration index' technique.
The concentration index is a measure of how equally a
health variable is distributed across a population ranked
by income level. As a single numeric, the concentration
index allows degrees of equity to be easily captured and
compared, in order to determine the extent and nature of
policy reform that is necessary.
b. Standardization: direct, indirect
A proper assessment of the equity of healthcare must
control through regression analysis for the confounding
effects of need and demographics, as well as other
sources of heterogeneity that might affect healthcare use.
We standardize our measures of the use of healthcare on
three measures of need, as well as the main demographics
we take to be correlated to utilization, using both the
direct and indirect standardization techniques [8].
Direct standardization predicts the distribution of use
by expenditure quintile that would be observed if the dis-
tribution of the confounding variables (need, age and sex)
was the same for each quintile, but confounding variables
had quintile-specific effects. Indirect standardization
involves predicting the value of use in the same way, using
the observed values for the confounding variables, but
constraining their effect on use to be the same across all
q u i n t i l e s .  I n  s t a n d a r d i z i n g ,  w e  c o n t r o l  f o r  h e a l t h  c o n -
founding effects such as age, gender, and non-confound-
ing effects such as education, the log of household
expenditures and employment.
c. Methodology in poverty analysis
Our analysis of catastrophic health payments involves the
calculation of headcounts and overshoots. The un-
weighted headcount treats all households equally in cal-
culating the share of households that incur a catastrophic
health payment. This statistic assumes constant marginal
utility of income. A measure that is more sensitive to
equity concerns and that assigns more weight to house-
holds at the bottom of the distribution is the rank-
weighted headcount. The concentration index measures
the degree of equity in the incidence of catastrophic
health payments across the income distribution and a
negative index is indication that households at the lower
end of the distribution of total household expenditures
have a greater tendency to exceed the spending threshold
on health and incur catastrophic health payments [7].Salti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
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The depth of the impact of catastrophic payments is
calculated using the overshoot, which calculates the aver-
age excess above the threshold. Like the headcount, the
un-weighted version of the overshoot treats any dollar in
excess of the threshold equally, regardless of which
household is spending it. The rank-weighted overshoot
instead assigns greater weight to overshoot spending by
households at the bottom of the expenditure distribution.
The concentration index measures the equity of the over-
shoot across the distribution of household expenditures:
a positive value indicates that the overshoot tends to be
greater among the better off.
When it comes to the analysis of poverty, we are unable
to capture the impoverishing effects of healthcare spend-
ing (particularly when its scale is catastrophic) when our
poverty line is defined on the basis of expenditure levels:
the larger an individual's spending on healthcare, the like-
lier the individual's overall expenditures exceed the pov-
erty line, which leads to an artificially lower poverty
headcount. One approach that is commonly used to
address this difficulty in constructing a valid measure of
poverty is to calculate net poverty rates and net poverty
gaps, which include only non-health spending [7]. The
weakness of this approach is that insofar as the poverty
line is constructed to include spending on healthcare, net
figures will overstate poverty. Another approach that we
propose is to extrapolate from the overall poverty line
and the composition of the mean household's spending a
poverty line for non-health expenditures. Poverty rates
and gaps calculated based on this line are not affected by
the extent of healthcare spending, nor should the thresh-
old itself include expenditures on health. This method is
similar in essence to the one developed by Wagstaff et al.
(chapter 19) [7]. One of the major limitations in this
approach is the arbitrariness of choosing the breakdown
in the expenditures of the mean household to extract
from the poverty line the amount of spending on non-
health related goods.
Data limitations
Because health expenditures are not disaggregated into
different classes or types of healthcare goods and ser-
vices, we have no information on the nature of healthcare
consumption. Thus, for example we have no means of
discerning publicly provided healthcare from health ser-
vices that are privately provided. Similarly, we cannot dis-
tinguish between inpatient, outpatient and specialist care.
Another limitation of the household survey is the pau-
city of variables measuring health outcomes. Disabilities
and chronic conditions are recorded; however data on
health status, whether self-assessed or measured by a
healthcare professional, were not collected in this survey.
Furthermore, unlike many surveys of the living condi-
tions of households, this survey fails to record recent ill-
ness or injury, recent visits to healthcare centers or the
recent use of the services of a healthcare professional.
Results and Discussion
Distribution of need
Table 2 presents a breakdown of the first two of our need
variables (the presence of a disability and the presence of
a chronic condition) across quintiles of expenditures per
adult equivalent (Table 2).
The incidence of disability decreases steadily across
expenditure quintiles moving from close to 3% for the
poorest fifth to 1.2% for the richest quintile. When stan-
dardized on age and gender whether directly or indi-
rectly, these figures become slightly higher than the non-
standardized figures particularly for the poorer quintiles.
The incidence of chronic disease across quintiles shows
the opposite trend to the one for disabilities: the inci-
dence of chronic disease increases monotonically from
14.3% in the poorest quintile to 18.6% in the top quintile.
Table 2: Need across expenditure quintiles
Poorest 2 3 4 Richest Total
%of quintile with disability 2.9% 2.0% 2.2% 1.7% 1.2% 2.0%
%of quintile with disability ind. 
std.
3.0% 2.0% 2.2% 1.7% 1.2% 2.0%
%of quintile with disability dir. 
std.
3.3% 2.1% 2.3% 1.6% 1.2% 2.1%
% of quintile with chron. cond. 14.3% 16.0% 16.4% 18.3% 18.6% 16.7%
% of quintile with chron. cond. 
ind. std.
15.9% 16.8% 16.8% 16.8% 16.4% 16.5%
% of quintile with chron. cond. 
dir. std.
16.5% 17.7% 17.6% 17.6% 17.3% 17.3%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
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This difference may be due to a difference in the fre-
quency and accuracy of diagnoses that the various expen-
diture classes have access to. When standardized on age
and gender, the differences across quintiles shrink some-
what as the standardized figures are slightly higher for
poorer quintiles and lower for richer ones.
The distribution of health care expenditures
a. The incidence of health-related expenses
W e  r e po rt  m eas u r e s  o f  t h e  i n ci d e n c e  o f  h e a l t h - r e l a t ed
expenses, including spending on health insurance (Table
3). The three columns of the table report the average inci-
dence by expenditure quintile, for the un-standardized
incidence of health-related expenses, its indirectly stan-
dardized measure and its directly standardized measure.
Even controlling for our three measures of need as well as
other correlates of healthcare spending, Table 3 show that
the incidence of health related expenditures is regressive:
holding fixed the presence of a disability or a chronic con-
dition, the recent birth of a child, age, gender, education
and employment, and estimating the predicted incidence
of the presence of any healthcare spending by expendi-
ture quintile shows that the poorest quintile is less likely
to spend on health care, which we take here to be an indi-
cation of a lower level of healthcare use. However, the
probability of healthcare spending doesn't increase
monotonically across expenditure quintiles: the second
quintile is more likely to "consume" healthcare than are
the next two, and the third and fourth quintiles have
almost identical health consumption probabilities. The
single largest gap separates the poorest quintile from the
next to poorest, for all three measures. In the absence of
any direct measure of income, a measure of household
expenditure is used as a control variable. The results are
qualitatively unchanged when only non-health expendi-
tures are used as a control.
We note the remarkable difference between the indi-
rectly standardized measures and the observed directly
standardized rates of healthcare use. Thus, when overall
means of the non-confounding variables are used (in
indirect standardization), predicted healthcare spending
is much lower for all five quintiles than if we assumed
quintile means for household expenditures, employment
and education. The absolute difference in predicted usage
rates across quintiles is roughly the same for all three
measures, which makes the difference proportionately
much larger when use is indirectly standardized. This is
the result of the substantial differences in the non-con-
founding variables (expenditures, employment and edu-
cation) across quintiles.
b. Out-of-pocket expenditures on health
We also look at average out-of-pocket expenditures
(excluding insurance payments) on health by expenditure
quintile (Table 4). The pattern is very similar to that of
the incidence of health related payments: out-of-pocket
expenditures increase with expenditure quintiles, even
when standardized on need, age and sex and controlling
for total household expenditures, employment and edu-
cation. The largest proportional increase is between the
average out-of-pocket expenditures on health of the 4th
quintile and that of the top fifth of the expenditure distri-
bution, as both observed and standardized expenditures
of the highest spending quintile are over double those of
the 4th quintile.
To further examine the equity of average out-of-pocket
expenditures on health, we construct concentration
curves (Figure 2), which show the cumulative share of
healthcare spending against the distribution of expendi-
tures per adult equivalent. The curve shows a substantial
gap from the equality line which is also reflected in the
corresponding concentration index of 0.676. Out-of-
pocket health expenditures appear to be progressive.
We reconstruct the concentration curve for out-of-
pocket expenditures once they have been indirectly stan-
dardized on need (Figure 3). Indirectly standardized
expenditures appear to be substantially more regressive
than observed health expenditures: once need and rele-
vant demographics are accounted for, the resulting mea-
sure of out-of-pocket expenditures on healthcare shows
Table 3: Incidence of health related expenditures by expenditure quintile
Quintile Observed Indirectly Stand. Directly Stand.
Poorest 0.85 0.46 0.85
2 0.91 0.53 0.91
3 0.90 0.52 0.90
4 0.90 0.52 0.90
Richest 0.93 0.55 0.93
Total 0.90 0.51 0.90
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
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serious inequity in the healthcare spending across the
income distribution.
c. The disability card
A service with much narrower subscription and more
limited use is the disability card provided by MoSA. The
program is called "Rights and Access Program for the
Disabled". Its objective is to ensure that persons with dis-
abilities are self-reliant, can live independent lives and are
integrated into society. During the last 10 years, the pro-
gram has issued disability cards to 60,000 persons, 22,000
of whom have been provided technical aid [10]. Each per-
son with disabilities registered with the program is
assessed for needs and the system has a database of needs
for services. Card holders are eligible for specialized aid
and services at accredited institutions, yet for the past
couple of years the program has faced many difficulties
due to shortage in financing [10]. Only 1,150 survey
respondents answer the disability card question, which is
the number of respondents who report having a disabil-
ity. Of these, 423 respondents hold a disability card, and
only 176 have used it in the past year. The distribution of
the use of the services provided by the disability card
(Table 5) shows that the observed incidence of use does
not increase monotonically. However, once this use vari-
able is standardized, it increases with expenditure per
adult equivalent. Higher household expenditures are
associated with a higher likelihood of using the disability
card.
The use of healthcare services, whether measured by
the presence of any health-related expense, the use of a
disability card to access government provided health ser-
vices, or the value of out-of-pocket expenditures on
Table 4: Out-of-pocket health related expenditures by expenditure quintile
Quintile Observed
(000 LL)
Indirectly Stand.
(000 LL)
Directly Stand.
(000 LL)
Poorest 73 85 75
2 149 159 153
3 216 224 219
4 361 357 353
Richest 756 750 730
Total 309 313 303
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Figure 2 Concentration curve for healthcare spending. Source: 
Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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health appears to be regressive when measured against
the distribution of overall household expenditures per
adult equivalent. This result holds for the observed values
of healthcare use as well as values standardized on need
and other health determinants. Our results for equity in
need showed disparity in the patterns of each need vari-
able, but the more prevalent of our two need variables
(the presence of a chronic health condition) put upper
expenditure quintiles at more of a disadvantage. The
results we find for use, even when standardized for need
show patterns that consistently favor the rich.
Among the disabled for whom we have expenditures
data, we report the quintile distribution of those holding
a disability card (Table 6).
The impact of catastrophic health payments
As a background to the discussion of catastrophic health
payments and their impact on welfare, we look at the
breakdown across expenditure quintiles of the share of
healthcare in household expenditures as well as the share
of healthcare in non-food expenditures. We also look at
the breakdown of the characteristics of individuals mak-
ing catastrophic payments [11]. The characteristics that
Table 5: Use of the MOSA disability card
Quintile Observed Indirectly Stand. Directly Stand.
Poorest 3‰
6,624
1‰
6,624
2‰
6,155
22 ‰
6,744
2‰
6,744
2‰
6,236
34 ‰
6,432
3‰
6,432
3‰
5,976
44 ‰
6,558
4‰
6,558
4‰
6,078
Richest 3‰
6,059
4‰
6,059
5‰
5,536
Total 3‰
32,417
3‰
32,417
3‰
29,981
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Table 6: Ministry of Social Affairs disability card by expenditure quintile
Quintile Observed Indirectly Stand. Directly Stand.
Poorest 3‰
6,624
1‰
6,624
2‰
6,155
22 ‰
6,744
2‰
6,744
2‰
6,236
34 ‰
6,432
3‰
6,432
3‰
5,976
44 ‰
6,558
4‰
6,558
4‰
6,078
Richest 3‰
6,059
4‰
6,059
5‰
5,536
Total 3‰
32,417
3‰
32,417
3‰
29,981
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/9/1/11
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we look at are gender, geographical regions (mohafaza)
and age.
We analyze the effect of health payments on household
impoverishment, including accounting, under various
assumptions, for the number of households who fall
under the poverty line due to health payments. We find
that health's share in expenditures increases monotoni-
cally across quintiles, and that the proportion of non-
food expenditures spent on health increases most when
we move from the first to the second quintile and from
the third to the fourth quintile (Table 7). This preliminary
look is an indication that spending on health seems to be
"normal" (where expenditure is a proxy for income) and
expenditure-elastic as spending on healthcare must
increase more than proportionally with overall expendi-
tures for the share of health to be rising over quintiles.
a. Who incurs catastrophic health payments?
Unsurprisingly, the gender breakdown of individuals
making catastrophic health payments (Figure 4) is
strongly skewed towards women (where 53% of people
incurring catastrophic health payments are women,
whereas women are only 50% of individuals not making
catastrophic health payments). The difference in the inci-
dence of catastrophic payments by gender is significant at
the 1% level.
We compare the geographical breakdown of house-
holds making catastrophic healthcare payments to that of
households whose expenditure on healthcare does not
exceed 25% of their overall household expenditures (Fig-
ure 5): the sharpest difference in the distribution is in the
mohafaza of Nabatieh which accounts for around 9% of
households whose healthcare payments fall below 25% of
total household expenditures but close to 35% of house-
holds incurring catastrophic healthcare. The mohafaza of
the South also shows sharp contrast: around 13% of
households with non-catastrophic payments and close to
18% of households straddled with healthcare payments.
Other remarkable differences that deserve note are that
about 35% of households who spend less than a quarter of
their income on healthcare are in Mount Lebanon. Simi-
larly, the otherwise quite poor mohafaza of the North
houses 17% of households whose payments are non-cata-
strophic but just 6% of households making catastrophic
health payments. These results show an overlap between
the districts that exhibit the starkest contrast in cata-
strophic healthcare payments and the incidence of
repeated episodes of political violence (mainly in the gov-
ernorates of Nabatieh and South Lebanon, in the south-
ern part of the country) and their legacy of liabilities in
Table 7: Share of health in expenditures by quintile
Quintile Health share in expenditures Health share in non-food expenditures
Poorest 4.8% 6.9%
26 . 3 % 8 . 7 %
36 . 5 % 8 . 5 %
47 . 5 % 9 . 4 %
Richest 8.2% 9.7%
Total 6.6% 8.6%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Figure 4 The gender distribution of catastrophic health pay-
ments. Source: Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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terms of lifetime disabilities and risks in terms of unex-
ploded mines and munitions.
We also look at the incidence of catastrophic payments
per mohafaza (Figure 6) and find that Nabatieh has, by
far, the highest risk of catastrophic health payments
(17%), the South is a distant second (7%).
Individuals who face catastrophic health payments are
unsurprisingly significantly older (15 years) than those
who don't. Households faced with catastrophic health
payments tend to be slightly smaller by close to one per-
son on average (Table 8).
We put all of these effects together in a logistic regres-
sion of the probability of incurring catastrophic health
payments so we can control for all the confounding
effects including gender, age, mohafaza, need, insurance
coverage and insurance type (Table 9). We find that log
expenditures per adult equivalent are associated with sig-
nificantly higher log odds of catastrophic payments, as is
age. Two of our need variables (the presence of a disabil-
ity and the presence of a chronic condition) are associ-
ated with significantly higher odds of catastrophic
payments. All public insurance plans are associated with
lower probability of catastrophic health payments, as is
private health insurance that is self-paid or syndicate pro-
vided. The omitted governorate is Beirut, the capital, and
we find that the Bekaa and the North have, on average, a
significantly lower incidence of catastrophic health pay-
ments (at 1 and 10% significance, respectively), whereas
the governorates of the South and Nabatieh have signifi-
cantly higher risk of catastrophic health payment, as the
results of the bivariate analysis in Figure 6 also indicates.
b. Welfare effects of catastrophic health payments
Table 10 shows the un-weighted headcount, its concen-
tration index and a rank-weighted headcount, a measure
of the overshoot, its concentration index and a rank-
weighted overshoot for households that incur cata-
strophic health payments. Rank-weighted measures
introduce a normative interpretation to the headcount
and overshoot as it attaches more importance to the con-
tribution of poorer households to these indexes. The
rank-weighted headcount is also the headcount multi-
plied by the complement of the concentration index [12].
These metrics are computed under 5 different values of
the threshold for catastrophic payments (5%-25% in
increments of 5%) and under 3 different values of the
threshold for health expenditures out of non-food
expenses. The last line of the table reports the mean posi-
tive overshoot which measures the intensity of the over-
shoot for households that face catastrophic health
payments.
Table 10 shows that the concentration index of head-
counts is consistently negative, indicating that house-
holds at the bottom of the distribution are more likely to
incur catastrophic health payments, using a variety of dif-
ferent possible thresholds for catastrophic payments.
This might be the result of a rigid payment structure that
is not a function of income. The concentration index is
greatest for the lowest value of the threshold, which
thereby results in the biggest discrepancy between the
weighted and un-weighted measures of the headcount.
Interestingly, however, the concentration index of over-
shoots is positive indicating that while poorer households
are more at risk of catastrophic payments, the dollar
amounts of these payments is progressive: the better off
tend to face larger overshoots. This result may be driven
by non-linearity in health consumption which requires a
minimal level of health spending regardless of total
expenditure, but then increases more than proportion-
ately as total expenditures increase.
Using only non-food expenditures (and adjusting the
thresholds accordingly) gives qualitatively similar results
in terms of the analysis of progressivity and poverty
impact: head counts have a negative concentration index
Figure 6 Incidence of catastrophic payments by Mohafaza (prov-
ince). Source: Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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Table 8: Characteristics of individuals facing catastrophic-health payments
Non-catastrophic (health payments < 
25% of expenditures)
Catastrophic (health payments >= 25% 
of expenditures)
Age 29.4 40.5
Household Size 4.5 3.5
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/9/1/11
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which makes the discrepancy between un-weighted and
weighted headcounts largest when the threshold is low-
est. Overshoots are progressive.
The impoverishing effect of healthcare spending
a. Poverty analysis using national and World Bank poverty 
lines
Conventional poverty analysis is conducted using 4 dif-
ferent poverty lines: a deep national poverty line equiva-
lent to expenditures of $2.2 per person per day, a national
poverty line of $4 per person per day, the deep poverty
line of $1 (or 1.08 in PPP) and the poverty line of $2 (or
2.15 in PPP) used by the World Bank, keeping in mind
that the rate of exchange of the dollar to the Lebanese
Pound is LL1,500/$. Poverty rates are calculated as a
headcount of individuals lying below the poverty line, as a
fraction of the overall population. Poverty gaps are calcu-
lated as the average shortfall from the poverty line (per
year). And normalized poverty gaps express poverty gaps
as a percentage of the poverty line. For poverty rates, pov-
erty gaps and normalized poverty gaps, we calculate both
gross and net measures, where health expenditures are
included in the gross measures and netted out in the net
measures.
In Table 11 we report the figures from the poverty anal-
ysis described above. Excluding healthcare from house-
hold resources increases the poverty headcount by only
about a percentage point for the deep poverty line and by
about 4 percentage points for the poverty line for national
figures for poverty lines and by less than that for World
Bank lines. More substantial differences in poverty rates
come from comparing national to World Bank figures:
the poverty line for Lebanon gives a gross poverty rate of
a r o u n d  2 7 %  w h e r e a s  t h e  s a m e  r a t e  i s  o n l y  a r o u n d  5 %
when the World Bank poverty line is used. The gross pov-
erty gap is on the order of LL167,000 a year if we use the
national poverty line, the net poverty gap is closer to
LL200,000, and the poverty gap is around 8% of the pov-
erty line. The calculated gaps are much narrower using
World Bank poverty lines which show much lower pov-
erty rates.
Looking at some of the differences between individuals
classified as poor according to the national poverty line
(Table 12), we find that poor households tend to spend a
lower share of their resources on health (4.7% vs. 7.3% for
the non-poor), but interestingly, they are also less likely to
suffer catastrophic health payments (2% vs. 6.4% for non-
poor). The out-of-pocket expenditures on health are also
unsurprisingly lower for individuals below the poverty
line: on average, an individual in poverty spends close to
LL78,000 on health a year whereas the non-poor average
is around LL403,000 per year. This is further confirma-
tion of the result we found in Table 7 that health is a nor-
mal good.
Table 9: The determinants of catastrophic health 
payments.
Dependent variable:
Presence of catastrophic
health payments
N = 13,944
Logistic regression
Log household expenditures
per adult equivalent
0.50**
(0.08)
Age 0-15 -1.73**
(0.17)
Age 16-25 -1.35**
(0.18)
Age 26-45 -1.51**
(0.15)
Age 46-65 -1.15**
(0.14)
Disability 0.70**
(0.25)
Chronic condition 0.79**
(0.12)
Presence of a recent mother -0.36
(0.36)
Male -0.12
(0.09)
NSSF -1.98**
(0.21)
Coop -2.23**
(0.25)
Insurance (Army) -2.20**
(0.23)
Private insurance (employer) 0.23
(0.27)
Private insurance (own) -1.58**
(0.37)
Private insurance (mutual) 0.98**
(0.32)
Private insurance (syndicate) -1.62**
(0.40)
Public insurance 1.67**
(0.26)
Mount Lebanon -0.01
(0.16)
North -0.40+
(0.23)
Bekaa -1.16**
(0.25)
South 0.77**
(0.18)
Nabatieh 1.52**
(0.26)
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/9/1/11
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b. Poverty analysis using a "non-health" poverty line
We define a hypothetical poverty line for non-health
expenditures using the share of health in expenditures of
the average household (6.6%), and find a poverty line of
$2.9 per person per day on non-health expenditures. In
Table 13, we obtain a headcount of 15.4%, almost identi-
cal to the poverty rate of 15.6% when the midpoint of the
upper and lower poverty lines is used. The poverty is
deeper when health expenditures are included but the
difference is negligible (LL6,000 per year).
The more interesting analysis to be conducted using
this new poverty line is to try to identify individuals who
fall under one of these lines but above the other. We call
health-induced poverty the poverty of individuals whose
non-health expenditures put them above the non-health
expenditures poverty line, but whose overall expenditures
fall below the poverty line for total household expendi-
tures per capita. This is in line with the impoverishing
effect of health care spending. We call health-obscured
poverty the poverty of individuals whose non-health
spending profile makes them poor, but whose health
spending is substantial enough to pull them above the
poverty line. Unsurprisingly, these two groups of individ-
uals, shown in the off-diagonal cells in Table 14, have very
different shares of health in their overall spending: health
constitutes around 1.3% of the spending of the health-
induced poor, and over 28% of the spending of the health-
obscured poor. Health-induced poverty shows no overlap
with the incidence of catastrophic payments, whereas
health-obscured poverty is associated with very high
rates of catastrophic payments (46%).
The spending profile on non-health related goods by
the health-induced poor is comparable to that of individ-
uals above the poverty line. It is the shortfall in their
spending on health that pushes them into poverty.
In any analysis of the welfare effects of health pay-
ments, the health-obscured poor is a group that deserves
attention if we are concerned about the validity of our
methodology for measuring poverty: if we abstracted
from healthcare payments, this group's spending profile
on non-health goods would put them in poverty. So not
only are the health-obscured trailing behind on non-
health consumption, they are also spending more on
healthcare than the typical "poor" household, which at
once, obscures their poverty status and indicates that
they are incurring large health expenses which is cause
for concern in its own right. Thus, conventional poverty
analysis fails to capture households whose poverty is
health-obscured. To the extent that these households'
spending on health hinders their ability to spend on other
Table 10: Percentage of households incurring catastrophic payments for healthcare
Share of overall expenditures Share of non-food expenditures
5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 15% 25% 40%
Head Count 23.3% 13.3% 8.4% 5.6% 3.7% 11.8% 6.0% 2.3%
Concentration
Index
-0.28 -0.26 -0.24 -0.22 -0.21 -0.28 -0.26 -0.21
Weighted
Head Count
30.0% 16.8% 10.5% 6.8% 4.5% 15.2% 7.5% 2.8%
Overshoot 4.3% 2.8% 1.8% 1.2% 0.8% 3.0% 1.5% 0.5%
Concentration
Index
0.13 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.25
Weighted
Overshoot
3.8% 2.3% 1.5% 0.9% 0.6% 2.7% 1.3% 0.4%
Mean Positive
Overshoot
18.5% 20.8% 21.8% 22.3% 22.4%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/9/1/11
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goods, health spending has an impoverishing effect on
these households. While an-income based approach to
poverty analysis would be able to detect the poverty of
health impoverished households, this effect is missed by
any expenditure based poverty analysis, as households
whose health spending is substantial will show up as non-
poor even when their spending on non-health goods is
low.
The equity implications of health financing methods
In this section we compare the insurance type by wealth
(using wealth quintiles and poverty headcounts), in an
attempt to answer the question: who is insured and what
type of plan do they have?
The results obtained, are analyzed by contrasting the
quality of services provided by either class of plan. As a
last task in this section we investigate the effect of the
type of plan on the amount spent on health.
Table 11: Measures of poverty based on consumption gross and net of spending on health care
Gross of health 
payments
(1)
Net of health 
payments
(2)
Difference
Absolute
(3) = (2)-(1)
Relative
[(3)/(1)] × 100
$2.2 per day poverty 
line
Poverty headcount 5.3% 6.4% 1.1% 20.7%
Poverty gap (LL) 11,389 14,508 3,119 27.4%
Normalized gap 1% 1.2% 0.2% 20%
$4.4 per day poverty 
line
Poverty headcount 27.5% 31.6% 4.1% 14.9%
Poverty gap (LL) 167,061 197,710 30,649 18.3%
Normalized gap 7.6% 9.0% 1.4% 18.4%
$1.08 per day 
poverty line (WB)
Poverty headcount 0.2% 0.2% 0% 0%
Poverty gap 184 235 51 27.7%
Normalized gap 0.03% 0.04% 0.01% 33.3%
$2.15 per day 
poverty line (WB)
Poverty headcount 5.0% 6.0% 1% 20%
Poverty gap 10,000 12,821 2,821 28.2%
Normalized gap 1% 1.1% 0.1% 10%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Table 12: Health spending profile of the poor and non-poor
Poor
($4.4 per day)
Non-poor
($4.4 per day)
Total
Share of spending on 
healthcare
4.7% 7.3% 6.6%
Catastrophic health payments 2.0% 6.4% 5.2%
Out of pocket expenditures 
per head (LL)
78,211 403,078 313,796
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/9/1/11
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a. Who is insured and what type of plan do they have?
We first examine the difference in the coverage rates
across expenditure quintiles (Figure 7): only 18% of the
poorest fifth are insured and the proportion rises mono-
tonically across quintiles and reaches just over 70% for
the richest 20% of the population.
Among the insured, Figure 7 shows that the breakdown
across insurance schemes also changes across expendi-
ture quintiles: publicly provided insurance is the domi-
nant form of insurance for all but the top quintile and it
represents an overwhelmingly large fraction of the insur-
ance plans of the third quintile (close to 92%). Similarly,
the rate of private coverage is around 5% of the insured in
the bottom 60th percentile, rises to 10% for the next quin-
tile and accounts for a quarter of the insured in the top
fifth of the expenditure distribution.
Figure 8 looks at the crossover of the poverty head-
count with the insurance coverage variable, for both the
gross and net poverty headcounts as well as the "non-
health" poverty that we defined earlier: consistent with
the results in Figure 7, Figure 8 shows that poverty signif-
icantly reduces insurance coverage for both private and
public insurance. The difference between poor and non-
poor is similar for both the gross and the net headcounts.
The "non-health" poverty line defines sharper divides: the
"non-health" poor have lower levels of all types of insur-
ance than the poor under either of the other poverty
lines. An interpretation of this result is that once we iden-
tify as poor people who appear above the conventional
expenditure poverty line because of large expenditures on
health, and we identify as non-poor people who fall
under the conventional poverty line because they fall
Table 13: Non-health poverty line
$3.3 per day poverty line $2.9 per day non-health poverty line
Poverty headcount 15.6% 15.4%
Poverty gap (LL) 61,401 55,376
Normalized gap 3.6% 3.5%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Table 14: Health-induced and health-obscured poverty
Non-health poverty
Total poverty Poor Non-poor Total
Poor: Poor Health-induced
Share of spending on health 4.5% 1.3% 4.2%
Out of pocket expenditures on 
health (LL)
59,433 21,924 55,853
Risk of catastrophic health 
payments
2.2% 0 2.0%
Non-poor: Health-obscured Non-poor
Share of spending on health 28.4% 6.7% 7.1%
Out of pocket expenditures on 
health (LL)
661,955 356,856 361,483
Risk of catastrophic health 
payments
46% 5.1% 5.8%
Total:
Healthshare 6.5% 6.6%
Out of pocket expenditures 
(LL)
109,544 350,958
Risk of catastrophic health 
payments
5.8% 5.1%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/9/1/11
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short of making "average" health expenditures, but spend
more on non-health than we would expect them to at the
poverty line, the residual pool of poor households seems
to enjoy less insurance coverage.
We examine the differences in use by different groups
(Table 15). Observed use rates are highest for people cov-
ered by publicly provided insurance plans. However, the
observed use of the uninsured is almost as high. Once use
is indirectly standardized, it is individuals with private
insurance coverage that are likeliest to spend on health
and the uninsured that are least likely. Similarly, out of
pocket expenditures on health increase for all categories
once the figure is standardized on need and health deter-
minants, but the increase is proportionately highest for
individuals with private insurance.
The types of services that these plans cover differ sub-
stantially between privately and publicly provided insur-
ance. Public plans offer the full range of services
(medication, medical examination and lab analysis)
whereas private plans only offer partial coverage of these
services (Figure 9).
b. Hospitalization class and the quality of services
These results, however, should be seen in contrast with
the quality of services provided by either class of plan.
Public insurance accounts for the overwhelming majority
of second and third class hospitalization service, whereas
private insurance accounts for more first class hospital-
ization plans, by a relatively thin margin of 10% (Figure
10). The quality of care is obviously strongly related to
hospitalization class however we have no real measure of
the magnitude of the difference in the quality of service
across classes.
The flip side of this analysis breaks down each insur-
ance plan by class. We find that individuals with private
insurance plans are concentrated in first and second class
care (37% each) and only a quarter of them are eligible for
third class hospitalization. Whereas only 5% of public
insurance schemes provide first class hospitalization care,
close to 60% provide second class care and the remaining
35% received third class care at hospitals (Figure 11).
Finally, we look at the differences in hospitalization
class across quintiles: We break down the class coverage
of each quintile to find that first class hospital care is only
available to 2% of the lowest quintile and to 19% of the
richest quintile. Second class care is also less available to
the poorest (43%) than the richest (54%), but it is the next
to richest quintile that benefits the most from second
class care (60%). Access to third class care progressive,
and the proportion of households with third class cover-
age decreases secularly as we move along the distribution
of expenditures (Figure 12).
Figure 13 looks instead at the breakdown of each class
of coverage over quintiles: the share of individuals com-
Table 15: Health care use by insurance plan
Insured Uninsured
Private Public Total
Use 47.8% 52.9% 51.9% 52.7%
Use (ind. stand.) 55.6% 51.9% 52.5% 51.3%
OOP expenditures on 
health
484,125 327,687 352,051 279,822
OOP expenditures on 
health (ind. stand.)
498,570 329,331 354,161 286,711
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Figure 8 Type of insurance and poverty. Source: Authors' estimates 
using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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Figure 7 Insurance coverage by expenditure quintile. Source: Au-
thors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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ing from each of the first three expenditure quintiles
increases monotonically as we move down hospitaliza-
tion classes. Conversely, 67% of individuals with first class
coverage are of the top expenditure quintile, while only
22% of individuals getting third class coverage are from
the same quintile of expenditures.
Next we estimate a multinomial logit model of the class
of hospitalization based on demographics (age, gender),
insurance coverage (the presence of a plan, an indicator
for publicly provided insurance), the presence of a
chronic health condition, and the log of household
expenditures. We reported the predicted proportion of
each class of coverage based on these explanatory vari-
ables and find that the probability of coverage increases
monotonically from the poorest to the richest quintile for
both first and second class coverage, whereas the same
probability decreases secularly from poorest to richest for
third class coverage. For the bottom 60% of the expendi-
ture distribution, the predicted proportion covered
increases consistently from first to third class. Whereas
the top 40% are likeliest to have access to second class
hospitals care (Figure 14).
c. Health outcomes and health behavior by insurance plan
We investigate the effect of the type of plan on the
amount spent on health (Table 16). The insured seem to
spend an average of almost LL93,000 on health a year in
excess of the uninsured. When we break this down by
type of insurance plan, we find that this discrepancy is
driven by individuals with private insurance who consis-
tently tend to spend more on health, as well as individuals
covered by a couple of public funds (municipal govern-
ment plans and government cooperatives). Conducting
the same type of analysis for the share of spending on
health, we find, conversely, that while the insured spend
larger amounts on health insurance than the uninsured,
they devote a slightly smaller proportion of their expendi-
tures to health. Disaggregating the sample into the
sources of insurance plans, we find that results are driven
mostly by individuals covered by one of three plans: the
army and security forces plan, self-provided private
insurance and syndicate-provided private insurance.
Individuals covered by any of these three plans spend a
consistently smaller share of their expenditures on health
on average.
Next, we look at insurance coverage for people with
chronic health conditions, across expenditure quintiles
(Figure 15). We notice an interesting reversal: for the bot-
tom two quintiles, individuals with a chronic health con-
dition are likelier to be insured than individuals with no
chronic diseases, whereas the reverse is true for people
from the top 60% of the distribution of expenditures
(although the difference is negligible for the top quintile).
This is likely the effect of the composition of insurance
types for each quintile: the richer quintiles are likelier to
have private insurance, with premiums sensitive to the
underlying health condition of the insured.
The geographical distribution of healthcare expenditures
In this section, we map our quintile analysis to geograph-
ical regions (mohafazas). We break down each mohafaza
by expenditure quintile. We also investigate the difference
in the incidence of disabilities and the presence of chronic
h e a l t h  c o n d i t i o n s  a c r o s s  m o h a f a z a s .  W e  t h e n  e x a m i n e
geographical disparities in use variables (disability cards,
health expenditure, insurance coverage, hospitalization
class).
Expenditure quintiles
Beirut has the lowest concentration of the bottom two
quintiles and by far the highest of the top quintile of
expenditures. Mount Lebanon is also relatively well off
with around half the population of the mohafaza in the
Figure 9 Services covered by type of insurance plan. Source: Au-
thors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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Figure 10 Insurance type by hospitalization class. Source: Authors' 
estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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top two fifths of the expenditure distribution. The poor-
est districts are by far the North and the South. 45% of the
inhabitants of the North are in the bottom quintile of the
distribution, a quarter in the next quintile and only 6.5%
in the top quintile. Similarly, around a third of the resi-
dents of the South rank among the poorest fifth of the
country and 60% are in the bottom two quintiles. The
Bekaa is the province with the least inequality in the dis-
tribution of expenditures (Figure 16).
Need Variables
Disabilities are more prevalent in the Bekaa and the south
of the country and least in the North. Chronic conditions,
on the other hand, are significantly more prevalent in
Beirut than elsewhere in the country and incidence is also
lowest in the North. This may be a result of more chronic
diseases getting diagnosed in Beirut than elsewhere in the
country, but the data do not allow us to verify this propo-
sition (Table 17).
Use Variables
We restrict our attention to people with disabilities and
look at the geographical distribution of people with dis-
ability cards from the Ministry of Social Affairs as well as
the geographical distribution of insurance coverage. Bei-
rut and Nabatieh have the highest subscription rates for
the disabilities card (at around 45%) whereas in the
Bekaa, close to only a quarter of the disabled hold disabil-
ities cards from the Ministry of Social Affairs. Insurance
coverage for the disabled is highest in Beirut, but doesn't
exceed 43%, and it is lowest in the Bekaa at less than 25%
(Table 18).
Use variables also show large geographical variation
(Table 19): Nabatieh has the highest incidence of health-
care expenditures and the highest value of healthcare
spending of any mohafaza, but once standardized (indi-
rectly), Beirut becomes a very close second. The north
has the lowest rates of use and amounts spent, both
observed and standardized.
Insurance coverage shows large geographical dispari-
ties (Figure 17), with Beirut and Mount Lebanon showing
60% and 54% coverage respectively, but other mohafazas
(namely the North, South and Nabatieh) trailing around
34%. The prevalence of private insurance is highest in
Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Beirut has by far the highest
incidence of private insurance (close to a third) and by far
Figure 11 Hospitalization class by insurance type. Source: Authors' 
estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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Figure 12 Hospitalization class by expenditure quintile. Source: 
Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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Figure 13 Expenditure quintile by hospitalization class. Source: 
Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
0% 50% 100%
Expenditure quintiles
1
2
3
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
c
l
a
s
s
Expenditure quintile by hospitalization class
Poorest quintile
Second quintile
Third quintile
Fourth quintile
Richest quintile
 
Figure 14 Predicted hospitalization class by expenditure quin-
tile. Source: Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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the lowest of public insurance (just over 60%). Mount
Lebanon has the next highest rate of private insurance at
around 17% and about three quarters of the insured in
Mount Lebanon have publicly provided insurance. The
North, the Bekaa and Nabatieh show similar patterns of
rare private insurance (under 10%) and a large predomi-
nance of public insurance (close to or over 90%).
Hospitalization class also shows large disparities geo-
graphically (Figure 18): a fifth of the insured in Beirut
have access to first class coverage and another two fifths
h a v e  s ec o n d  c l as s  ca r e .  O n l y  4 %  o f  t h e  i n s u r ed  i n  t h e
South and 5% of those in the North have access to first
class care. Second class care constitutes the bulk of cover-
age for all mohafazas, over 60% in the North and the
Bekaa.
Table 16: Expenditures on health by insurance type
Health expenditures
(LL)
Share of expenditures on health
Public Insurance
Nssf 344,419 6.2%
Coop 437,239 6.3%
Armed Forces 255,486 5.2%
Municipal 581,508 12.2%
Average public 334,676 6.0%
Private Insurance
Employer-provided 682,588 6.7%
Self employed 726,792 4%
Mutual fund 583,874 10.3%
Syndicate 461,171 4.4%
Average private 623,218 5.2%
Average insured 377,900 6.0%
Average uninsured 280,562 7.0%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Figure 15 Insurance coverage for chronic disease, by expendi-
ture quintile. Source: Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household 
Survey
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Figure 16 Cumulative share of expenditures by quintiles, by Mo-
hafaza (province). Source: Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 
Household Survey
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Table 17: Disabilities and chronic disease by Mohafaza (province)
Mohafaza Incidence of disability Presence of chronic disease
Beirut 1.7% 25.8%
Mount Lebanon 1.9% 16.3%
North 1.2% 12.8%
Bekaa 2.5% 13.4%
South 2.9 18.8%
Nabatieh 2.8% 17.0%
Total 2.0% 16.2%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Table 18: Disability card and insurance coverage for the disabled, by Mohafaza (province)
Mohafaza Disability card Insurance
Beirut 44.3% 42.8%
Mount Lebanon 37.8% 35.1%
North 41.0% 29.7%
Bekaa 27.6% 24.8%
South 34.0% 28.1%
Nabatieh 46.4%% 20.7%
Total 36.8% 29.9%
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household Survey
Table 19: Incidence of use and OOP expenditures by Mohafaza (province) Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 
Household Survey
Mohafaza Use Use ind. stand. OOP on health
(in LL)
OOP on health ind. 
stand.
(in LL)
Beirut 53.1% 57.8% 580,691 550,581
Mount Lebanon 49.0% 49.1% 300,007 303,848
North 45.8% 48.4% 133,166 162,776
Bekaa 56.2% 54.1% 193,053 199,417
South 58.5% 52.8% 348,312 348,343
Nabatieh 63.5%% 58.2% 649,036 651,567
Total 52.4% 51.9% 313,796 319,344
Source: Authors' estimate from 2004/2005 Household SurveySalti et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2010, 9:11
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Conclusions
The results of our analysis highlight the vulnerability of
the lowest quintile of expenditures per adult equivalent,
particularly when measures of healthcare use are stan-
dardized for need and demographic and economic health
determinants. Not only is the healthcare use of the lowest
quintiles through spending on healthcare substantially
lower, they also appear to have less access to non-spend-
ing healthcare services as they are far less likely to benefit
from health insurance.
Our analysis of the effect of insurance on health spend-
ing shows that once use, out of pocket expenditures and
the share of spending on health are standardized, the
uninsured spend both less money on health and a larger
proportion of their total expenditures on health, further
confirming our results on the extreme vulnerability of the
lowest quintiles.
Furthermore, we take note of the weakness of running
expenditure-based poverty analysis when healthcare use
is also primarily measured through expenditures on
health and we adjust our poverty calculations by intro-
ducing a measure of poverty that abstracts from health
payments. This new measure allows us to hone in on seg-
ments of the expenditure distribution that are incorrectly
labeled as poor or non-poor under the standard total
expenditure based approach. Any welfare and equity
analysis of healthcare reforms should correct such mis-
classification.
Our results call for a serious reconsideration of the tar-
geting of health financing in Lebanon, as the lack of for-
mal health insurance for the poorest strata of the
Lebanese society makes it disproportionally exposed to
adverse conditions, especially in times of conflict and
instability. As it stands, the uninsured in Lebanon can
benefit from medical care and hospitalization at the
expenses of the Ministry of Public Health, either by going
to public hospitals or by seeking preadmission to private
ones, where services' payments are subject to a predeter-
mined ceiling. But the Ministry's mandate in terms of
coverage is ad-hoc and there are issues with the control of
patient flows across various levels of the health care sys-
tem [10]. The Ministry has limited ability to direct any of
the uninsured to its own hospitals and has no way of
knowing (in advance) of its full financial liability for pro-
viding these inpatient benefits. Because the Ministry can-
not turn away any uninsured patients (except for those
going to private hospitals who may not be guaranteed
admission if annual budget ceilings have been reached),
its total current (and future) expenditures on hospital
care are unpredictable. Payment ceilings at private hospi-
tals, indeed, sometimes can be exceeded when hospitals
successfully petition the Ministry of Finance for payment
after services have been provided.
The Ministry of Public Health in Lebanon is now
responsible for the hospital care of more than half the
population. It is implicitly liable for the more expensive
care required by the rising number of retired and elderly
persons who are not covered under any other insurance
fund. As our results have shown, there is a need to revise
the Ministry's strategy of covering health care for the
uninsured by designing an efficient and inclusive health
insurance system, which could have at least two pillars:
one that covers critical and essential healthcare for the
Lebanese at no cost, and an additional fully-funded pillar
where insurance contributions would be proportional to
income. This health insurance scheme would not only
insure equity, but will also reduce in the long run the out-
of-pocket expenditures of the Lebanese households.
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Figure 17 Insurance coverage by Mohafaza (province). Source: 
Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household Survey
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Figure 18 Distribution of hospitalization class by Mohafaza 
(province). Source: Authors' estimates using 2004/2005 Household 
Survey
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